None of these cases offered an exact precedent for the minimum coverage requirement. Congress had never imposed a precisely comparable requirement on individuals before. 10 This alone made it a difficult case.
Of course, the fact that a law is novel does not make it unconstitutional. 11 During the Great Depression, the Social Security Act was vigorously challenged as an unprecedented expansion of federal government authority to tax and spend -a point that Justice Ginsburg tried to make in the ACA oral argument. 12 In 1937, the Social Security Act challengers argued that Congress's power to tax and spend for the general welfare did not include the power to pay oldage pensions only to the elderly. In Helvering v. Davis, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Social Security tax on employees to provide pensions to the elderly, 13 but the outcome was not a foregone conclusion. Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented on the grounds that the Act was "repugnant to the Tenth Amendment," 14 just as the ACA challengers argued that the individual mandate invades state sovereignty.
Writing for the majority, Justice Cardozo apparently felt compelled to explain the national need for federal financial aid. He did so in language that could apply to health insurance today: 9 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010 . 10 See Wendy K. Mariner, Leonard H. Glantz & George J. Annas, Reframing Federalism-The Affordable Care Act (and Broccoli) in the Supreme Court, 367 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 12 (2012) .
11
But see Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2586 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("But sometimes 'the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent' for Congress's action."). 12 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 57, Dep't of Health and Human Serv. v. Fla., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) , available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf. 13 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act income tax on employees); see also Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding Social Security Act excise tax on employers). 14 Helvering, 301 U.S. at 646 (Reynolds, J. and Butler, J., dissenting).
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Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the wellbeing of the nation. What is critical or urgent change with the times.
The purge of nation-wide calamity that began in 1929 has taught us many lessons. . . . Spreading from state to state, unemployment is an ill not particular but general, which may be checked, if Congress so determines, by the resources of the nation. . . . But the ill is all one . . . whether men are thrown out of work because there is no longer work to do or because the disabilities of age make them incapable of doing it. Rescue becomes necessary irrespective of the cause. The hope behind this statute is to save men and women from the rigors of the poor house . . . . 15 This kind of contextual explanation was largely missing from the ACA litigation. 16 Without it, however,
15
Id. at 641. 16 An exception was Solicitor General Donald Verrilli's last minute plea at end of the last day of oral argument:
There is an important connection, a profound connection between that problem and liberty. And I do think it's important that we not lose sight of that . . . [because of the Medicaid expansion] there will be millions of people with chronic conditions like diabetes and heart disease, and as a result of the health care they will get, they will be unshackled from the disabilities that those diseases put on them and have the opportunity to enjoy the blessings of liberty. And the same will be true for -for a husband whose wife is diagnosed with breast cancer and who won't face the prospect of being forced into bankruptcy to try to get care for his wife and face the risk of having to raise his children alone, and I could multiply example after example after example.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 79-80, Dep't of Health and Human Serv. v. Fla., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) the Justices in the Joint Dissent described health insurance only as a commercial product, and then only in terms of traditional non-group indemnity insurance, which is underwritten so that it is actuarially fair: you only pay for your own personal risks. However, all but a small proportion of health insurance in the United States is either public benefit programs or private employee group insurance, which is not underwritten. See Fronstin, supra note 20, at 5 fig. 1 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 ("The mandate primarily affects healthy, often young adults who are less likely to need significant health care and have other priorities for spending their money."), at 2642 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., Alito, J., dissenting). In fact, the major reason that people are uninsured is that they cannot afford the cost of insurance.
SUMMARY 30 This was a more complex argument to make, one requiring knowledge of the health care system. The majority and minority Justices appeared to view the case through the lens of federalism. What was needed to convince a majority of the Justices to uphold the ACA's federal mandate under the Commerce Clause was a principled distinction between a requirement for health insurance coverage and a requirement to buy anything else -one that also served to distinguish the Commerce power from the police power. 31 Such a distinction depended on facts specific to the health care system that would not apply to the purchase of all products. 32 In short, to win the commerce clause argument, the government needed a limiting principle, and neither the government nor any Justice was able to articulate a sufficiently convincing one. 33 29 Id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J.) ("Persons subject to the mandate must now pay for medical care in advance (instead of at the point of service) and through insurance (instead of out of pocket).").
30
Id. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J.) ("One could call this concern the 'broccoli horrible,'" referring to the Chief Justice's mention of a mandate to buy green vegetables).
31
Id. at 2591, 2642 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., Alito, J., dissenting 793 (1997) . At the time, colleagues suggested that it should be an easy win: the Supreme Court would find a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide and strike down laws prohibiting physician assisted suicide, perhaps relying on Justice Kennedy's "mystery of human life" language in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) . But, the Court did not do so. Its decision made clear that the Court wanted a limiting principle on the purported right to assisted suicide, which the litigants did not provide. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 733 (1997) . 34 The majority's decision on the Medicaid eligibility expansion also demonstrated incomplete knowledge of the structure and history of Medicaid, but the decisive factor appeared to be preserving state jurisdiction over the state's laws implementing Medicaid programs.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601-8. The Chief Justice's opinion relied for the first time on the concept of coercion to find that the spending power precluded the federal government from ending all federal Medicaid funding of states that declined to adopt the newest category of eligible beneficiaries (adults under 65 years of age with incomes less than 133% of the federal poverty level) added by the ACA. Id. at 2606-7; 42 U.S.C. § § 1396(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 1396c (2012).
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views of the boundary between federal and state jurisdiction. 35 The idea that the parties failed to appreciate relevant facts about the structure and financing of the health care system is significant, but not because a factual analysis should displace doctrinal analysis.
Rather, doctrine requires interpretation when it is applied to new subject matter, and meaningful application of doctrine requires an accurate understanding of the subject matter. If the subject matter is misunderstood, the doctrine may be interpreted in incongruous ways, which may distort doctrine in its applications in other contexts. 36 Regardless of whether such an analysis would have upheld the individual mandate, it should have produced a more robust and persuasive refinement of the definition of commerce.
III. DOES LEGAL EDUCATION CONTRIBUTE TO INEFFECTUAL SCHOLARSHIP OR PRACTICE?
Two conclusions can be drawn from the public and courtroom debate over the constitutionality of the individual (1) health law issues pervade modern society; and (2) well trained lawyers failed to adequately explain or justify their positions on the constitutionality of the ACA. Both conclusions suggest that legal education may be missing an opportunity to prepare both scholars and practicing lawyers for effective careers today. Several critiques of legal education offer clues to what might contribute to this missed opportunity. The critiques of interest here are a highly selective sample. 37 I will not address the challenges that universities themselves face, which include increasing competition for students in a difficult economic environment with rising costs, income inequality, and high student loan debt, 38 In an address at the University of Michigan in January 2012, President Obama said: "So, from now on, I'm telling Congress we should steer federal campus-based aid to those colleges that keep tuition affordable, provide good value, serve their students well. We are putting colleges on notice . . . . If you can't stop tuition from going up, then the funding you get from taxpayers each year will go down." Obama in Ann Arbor: Text of the President's Speech on Affordability, ANNARBOR.COM (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.annarbor.com/news/obama-in-ann-arbor-text-of-thepresidents-speech-on-college-affordability/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
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Gene R. Nichol, Rankings, Economic Challenge, and the Future of Legal Education, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 345 (2012) . 42 universally lamented, that there is no need to mention them further. 43 The best-known criticisms of legal education are what I call the Ivory Tower Critiques. These argue that legal education (1) is overly abstract and distant from real world problems, with too much emphasis on theory, (2) offers limited attention to practice issues, in particular, what lawyers do interacting with clients, prosecutors, businesses, administrative agencies, and other lawyers, and (3) produces scholarship of limited relevance to practitioners or judges. 44 Legal education has been criticized for its distance from practice for decades, notably by Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank. 45 Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18 th Century Bulgaria, or something, which I'm sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn't of much help to the bar. 46 Perhaps this is why judges rarely read law review articles. Few law school professors would dispute the claim that their legal research, at least before tenure review, focuses on developing novel theories of law, which are read almost exclusively by other law professors. 47 The grain of truth in the ivory tower critique -one that is relevant to the ACA litigation -is that the focus on theory may blind lawyers to the need for more specific and intensive examination of the subject matter to which theory and doctrine may apply. However, this does not mean that law schools ought to abandon rigorous teaching about theory and doctrine. 48 Law schools and lawyers have struggled with the question of which model suits legal education since the Civil War era. 50 Nineteenth century German and other European university systems, which had established faculties in theology, philosophy, medicine, and law, apparently impressed several influential academics. 51 The European conception of law as a science that required formal study distinguished the legal profession from a mere guild for craftsmen. 52 It helped to characterize law as an academic discipline, instead of a trade, and worthy of placement within a university at a time when universities were becoming research institutions. It also offered an opportunity to develop an elite class of law professors capable of teaching the science -full-time academics who gradually replaced practicing lawyers as teachers. 53 These attractions elevated research and scholarship over occupational training as the benchmark for academic standing.
The TO THE 1980 'S 24, 51, 135, 265 (1983 Law professors have been expected to write scholarly articles, perhaps since then Dean of Harvard Law School urged it as one of three essential elements of the faculty in 1901. 55 Yet, the quality of law faculty scholarship is highly variable. Despite Chief Justice Roberts' critique, there are thoughtful, relevant and useful law review articles (many of them in health law). 56 However, the more practical and relevant they are, the less likely they are to provide support for tenure. If we are honest, we must concede that the pressure to be original in theory or, to a lesser extent, doctrine can produce irrelevant -sometimes ridiculousscholarship that would never be accepted in any other field of research. 57 . . is to sanction suicide, but only after a mandatory cooling-off period. Such a policy might, for example, require a suicidal person to 'give notice' of the desire to commit suicide one month in advance with the ability to rescind the notice at any point during the intervening period."). The authors were apparently not aware that suicide was (and is) not illegal, so their factual premise was in error. Instead, they made an interesting theoretical argument for replacing the non-existent crime with an impractical alternative, since a majority of suicide attempts are spur of the moment decisions, which are not likely to be affected by any notice requirement. of the accuracy of legal research. 58 Student journal editors are well trained in paragraph structure and reference formatting, but are rarely familiar with the subject matter of the article they "edit." Few law journals use peer review to vet articles submitted for publication, so external experts have no opportunity to evaluate the premises, methods or conclusions of papers before publication. Moreover, few experts who are able to notice errors even read the journals. Law students typically rely on law review articles for their own research, so that errors embedded in journals are often perpetuated rather than corrected over time. Law schools do some things well. The very first observation of the Carnegie Report was:
Within months of their arrival in law school, students demonstrate new capacities for understanding legal processes, for seeing both sides of legal arguments, for sifting through facts and precedents in search of the more plausible account, for using precise language, and for understanding the applications and conflicts of legal rules. Despite a wide variety of social backgrounds and undergraduate experiences, they are learning, in the parlance of legal education, to 'think like a lawyer.' 59 Learning how to think like a lawyer is especially valuable for issue-spotting, but it has a downside. One most law schools emphasize the priority of analytic thinking, in which students learn to categorize and discuss persons and events in highly generalized terms. This emphasis on analysis and system has profound effects in shaping a legal frame of mind. At a deep, largely uncritical level, the students come to understand the law as a formal and rational system, however much its doctrines and rules may diverge from the common sense understandings of the lay person. 60 The idea that law is a science -a set of (ideally neutral) principles that can be discerned with the appropriate analytic and conceptual skills -remains embedded in the core justification for legal education. 61 US law schools narrowed the scope of the original European idea of law as science. Nineteenth century European curricula included history, economics, political theory, sociology, Roman law, and comparative law as part of the study of law. US law schools dropped those subjects for decades and only slowly reintroduced them in somewhat different forms, typically under specialized rubrics like law and economics and law and society. 62 To be sure, critiques from successive movements -legal realism, positivism, critical legal theory, feminist theory, and social theory -have substantially 60 CARNEGIE SUMMARY, supra note 59, at 5. 64 The solution cannot be to ignore theory or return to the days of apprenticeship training. However, insistence on developing novel and arcane theories divorced from the factors that influence law is driving scholarship farther away from making a meaningful contribution to jurisprudence. 65 The future of law schools may depend on a revolutionary rethinking of their structure and curriculum. Of course, law schools have not ignored these challenges. Nonetheless, a multitude of obstacles has stymied meaningful change. Most valuable reforms implemented so far, such as clinical seminars and externships, tend to be additions to a crowded curriculum. 66 Moreover, they are often taught by clinical faculty, who complain of second class citizenship, often quite rightly. 67 The real problem is that patching in new courses does little to change the perspective of legal education. 63 See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE This brings me to a different set of criticisms of legal education, which I call the Social Justice Critique. This critique argues that many programmatic elements of the curriculum narrow the scope of legal analysis to one that preserves the status quo, perpetuates powerful elites 68 and stifles creative thinking about the law and solutions to legal problems. Of particular concern is the categorization of required and elective courses.
To social critics, the foundational courses of contracts, torts, civil procedure, and property immediately establish an image of law as primarily private case law. This private law emphasis reinforces the idea that corporate and property issues are the core of law, because they are the focus of learning how to think like lawyers. Directly or indirectly, it can train students to accept the existing structure of public and private institutions and financial relationships as normative and neutral in their effects, and thus to perpetuate the status quo. 69 Courses in legislation, administrative law, employment law, anti-discrimination law, and the like are typically relegated to elective status, creating the impression such subjects are peripheral in value. This can create a distorted picture of the legal landscape, especially since so much legal practice involves the drafting, interpretation, and application of legislation and regulations.
While the case method has substantial value in learning to think like a lawyer, the use of edited casebooks 68 Joan Williams notes that "one role of law school has been to train members of the elite to assume elite positions," and "Langdell invented his curriculum at Harvard to boss around other members of the elite," but adds that it now also serves as a pathway for non-elites to enter the elite class. Bob Gordon, Jack Schlegel, James May & Joan The expense of a legal education and the concentration of employment in corporate-oriented practice may exacerbate this effect, making access to justice unaffordable for low and middle-income Americans. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Judicial Abdication and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325 (2010); Rhode, supra note 42, at 23.
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Vol. 10:1 sometimes undermines creative thinking. 70 Some casebooks drain the life out of legal problems. Few contain facts to illuminate the context of legal problems. The discussion of cases leads students to focus on the legal issue, separate and apart from the social context. Problems are abstracted from their human dimension and considered only with respect to whether they fall within a rule. 71 The Supreme Court's oral arguments exemplified a similar "bloodless" debate. It teaches that the ethical and social consequences of justifiable principles are beyond the scope of relevant consideration.
The absence of context -how and why legal problems arise in a particular society -gives students little opportunity for thinking about how to make strategic choices. 72 Without practice at attention to context, law graduates may not recognize the complexity of their clients' problems. 73 In light of the dynamic nature of many legal rules, and especially regulations, there is significant need for thinking carefully not only about what legal remedies are available, but also why only these and not others exist, and whether others could be developed. In this way, context can nurture useful new theories in law.
The Carnegie Report also notes that law schools pay less attention to the civic, professional, ethical and leadership roles of lawyers. 74 See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 37, at 187. institutions. 75 Furthermore, a tight focus on legal doctrine can breed hammer-and-nail problems: when your only tool is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. If law is your tool, you may tend to view law as the sole cause of -and therefore the only solution to -a problem. 76 Sometimes, law is not the answer. Lawyers who fail to recognize complex sources of problems causes can miss the most effective solutions.
IV. HEALTH LAW OFFERS A MODEL FOR RETHINKING LEGAL EDUCATION, AT LEAST IN PART
The health law field suffers less from these criticisms than do most other legal fields and has several advantages that could be translated to other areas in the law curriculum.
A particular advantage of health law in responding to critiques of legal education is that, as an applied area, it cannot avoid attention to real world problems. Moreover, these problems range across social and economic life from birth to death, exposing students to a wide array of both doctrinal and practical issues. constitutional law, contracts, corporations, criminal law, employment law, environmental law, insurance, international law, patents, privacy, and torts. So many different legal issues are connected to health that one might devote one or more semesters to them without sacrificing attention to important doctrinal learning, not only because the field is so broad, but also because doctrine taught in other courses can be learned within health law courses. 87 Applied fields have many opportunities to use problemoriented methods, which require students to identify the different legal tools that could be brought to bear on a real problem. This approach is closer to law practice than the study of domains of law or legal doctrine in the abstract. 88 Many health law professors have embraced practical lawyering skills somewhat more enthusiastically than most other specialties, offering students opportunities to work with law firms, hospitals, and legislatures, and to draft briefs amici curiae for relevant litigation. 89 Northeastern University School of Law is a leading example of experiential (practice-based) legal education; its cooperative program places law students in supervised Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, as well as state departments of health and environmental protection. This is not to suggest that health law teaching is always successful. The American Health Lawyers Association surveyed 94 health law practitioners in 2011 on their evaluations of new health law graduates. Preliminary results suggest that those surveyed reported that the new associates were best at legal research, analytical and reasoning skills, and advocacy and persuasion. They were less well prepared in writing skills, strategic thinking, problem solving, administrative law and the regulatory process. Kevin Outterson, Associate Professor of Law at Boston University, Presentation at the American Health Law Association Annual Meeting (June 25, 2012) (copy on file with author).
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practice settings, especially in public interest, international and human rights law. 90 Scholarship in health law is often relevant to policymakers. Health law issues appear in the news almost daily, as well as in legislatures and courtrooms around the country. Keeping abreast of the field necessarily requires paying attention to real world developments, and this includes problems of economics, politics, and moral reasoning. One way to influence the development of the law is to reach policy-makers, and health law scholars often publish in medical and policy journals, such as Health Affairs and the New England Journal of Medicine, which policy-makers are likely to read. 91 Empirical research is also growing in health law, perhaps because of its emphasis on effective solutions to real problems. 92 dilettantism. 97 As a result, the quality of health law scholarship remains uneven. Some of the health law field's advantages may undermine rigor in scholarship.
For example, empirical and other research that is funded by external donors may be influenced, perhaps unwittingly, by the money itself or the donor's goals, in the same ways that conflicts of interest can affect biomedical research. 98 If funding is available for drafting new laws limiting liability, for example, but not for laws reducing the risk of harm, then more recommendations for liability limits are likely to be produced.
Health law often considers valuable insights from other disciplines, which should expand and enhance our view of the law and its effects. At times, however, viewing a legal issue only from a single disciplinary perspective can distort the analysis.
Learning a little bit about economics, sociology or epidemiology, for example, can be a dangerous thing, if one begins to view all law from the perspective of that discipline alone. 99 In some cases, the new disciplinary perspective overtakes the law, reversing their roles. If that happens, the law can be seen simply as a tool to achieve the 97 In this respect, health law resembles emergency medicine, which requires knowledge of many medical specialties. The medical profession did not recognize emergency medicine as a distinct specialty for many years, partly because of its applied nature. See goals of the other discipline, rather than a field with its own values and goals. 100 A different kind of bias may arise from one's philosophy of law or personal ideology. 101 Although this is hardly unique to health law, health law scholarship may have more opportunities to fall prey to such bias, because it examines so many controversial social issues on which most people have strong opinions. It can be difficult to maintain a truly neutral perspective when analyzing laws or doctrines that affect the outcome of an issue important to the scholar. 102 This is especially risky in applied fields like health law, where scholars may have a somewhat shallow understanding of the doctrine that applies to a hot-button issue and neglect to adequately analyze precedent and arguments that contradict a preferred interpretation. 103 300 JAMA 1575 300 JAMA (2008 (noting that earlier cases were understood to limit the Second Amendment's protection to a collective right to maintain a militia).
can be easy to convince ourselves that our preferred understanding of doctrine or precedent is the indisputably correct interpretation, especially where precedent is limited and open to interpretation. 104 Some constitutional law scholars seem to have succumbed to this error in arguing about the scope of the Commerce Clause during the ACA litigation. 105 Strong convictions about the correct interpretation of law can lead to advocacy. Of course, practicing lawyers properly advocate for their clients, and make clear that they are doing so. Scholarship is a different matter. It should offer honest, balanced analysis that recognizes different approaches and opinions. Scholarship does not preclude arguing for a particular interpretation or approach, but arguments are not statements of fact. There should be no hidden agendas in scholarship. When scholarship presents a preferred interpretation as fact or doctrine, it is poor scholarship. 106 It may also cross the line into advocacy. If it curriculum before graduation, the third year of law school could be transformed into an analog of medical school clerkships. Third year students could work in government agencies, non-profit, and legal service organizations. There should be plenty of opportunities for such placements in the health care system, but similar opportunities could surely be found in education, housing, family law, energy and environmental placements. In this way, legal education might begin to respond more effectively to both the Ivory Tower and Social Justice critiques and improve access to justice for everyone.
VI. Conclusion
Arguments over the constitutionality of the ACA -in the courts, in public debates, in scholarly articles, and blogsillustrate the pervasiveness of health law issues in society. It also demonstrates that many participants in that debate, both those for and against the ACA, remained wedded to theories that have become disconnected from twenty first century realities. Legal education may have something to answer for in this respect. The more law moves away from strict principles into nuanced adjustments to new circumstances, the more lawyers will need to understand the circumstances. As the search for more affordable, responsive, and responsible legal education continues, it is worth emulating the best features of health law. Health law scholars should be proactive in translating their successes into broader curriculum changes, especially attention to context, both in theory and practice. Because the context includes how law affects society at large, meaningful reform should adopt as its ultimate goal extending affordable access to justice for all. education, which requires law graduates who pass a partial licensure examination to practice for two or three years (much like a medical residency) and then take another examination to qualify for full licensure.
